The FELA and Trial by Jury by Laughlin, Stanley K., Jr.
COMMENTS
THE FELA AND TRIAL BY JURY
At twelve-ten a.m. on the morning of January 2, 1952 an east-
bound train was crossing Bettes Corners in Akron, Ohio. Carl Inman,
the watchman, was standing slightly west of the tracks his back to-
ward Tallmadge Avenue traffic. Moments earlier he had halted ve-
hicular traffic and now he was performing his duty of watching for
"hotboxes" on the passing train. A drunken driver heading northeast
on Home Avenue ran a stop sign, attempted to turn left onto Tall-
madge and struck down Inman.
Inman brought suit against his employer, under the Federal
Employers Liability Act,1 alleging that the railroad had been negli-
gent in failing to provide him with a safe place to work. The jury
agreed. The court of appeals reversed ordering judgment for defend-
ant' and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to consider the case.3 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 and on December 14,
1959 affirmed the Ohio Court of Appeals.' Four justices dissented
holding that a jury case had been presented.' Of fifty-two such FELA
cases heard on the merits in the past seventeen years by the Court this
was only the sixth in which a withdrawal of the cause from the jury
had been upheld.
A little over a month later the Court heard the case of Davis v.
Virginian Ry.8 In that case there was evidence tending to show that
the plaintiff, a yard conductor, was ordered to perform in thirty
minutes a "spotting" job normally requiring fifty minutes to over an
hour, and to do so with the aid of two inexperienced brakemen. In
running from one car to another, the plaintiff slipped from a ladder
and was injured. The Virginia trial court took the cause from the jury
and the states highest court affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court, by a six-to-three vote, reversed, holding that a jury question
had been raised. These cases have reopened the heated controversy
1 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
2 Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 108 Ohio App. 124, 161 N.E.2d 60 (1958).
3 168 Ohio St. 335, 154 N.E.2d 442 (1958).
4 359 U.S. 958 (1959).
5 361 U.S. 138 (1959).
6 Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., (Douglas, J. dissenting) 361 U.S. at 143 (1959).
7 See Harris v. Pennyslvania R.R. (appendix to concurring opinion of Douglas, J.)
361 U.S. 15 at 20 (1959) and Wilkerson v. McCarthy, (appendix to concurring opinion
of Douglas, J.) 336 U.S. 53 at 71 (1949). See also Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., (appendix to dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.) 352 U.S. 521 at 548
(1957).
8 361 U.S. 354 (1960).
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among lawyers connected with the railroad industry or with railroad
employees or their organizations over the Court's decisions in the past
twenty years defining a jury question under the FELA.
The criticisms leveled at the Court and with which this paper is
concerned can be assimilated into three major categories: (1) The
Court has taken an Act which bases recovery on negligence and con-
verted it into one which provides liability without fault. (2) The
Court has done violence to the common law of negligence, particularly
in depriving the trial judge of his historic function of keeping the jury
verdict within the bounds of reason. (3) The Court continues to hear
FELA cases on certiorari in which it formulates no discernible legal
standards but merely resolves the peculiar issue between the parties
to the case.
We shall first consider each of these criticisms in more detail and
then attempt to analyze their validity.
"Judicial Workmen's Compensation"
The FELA is based on negligence and in comparison with work-
men's compensation acts (providing limited liability for all job-incurred
injuries) it has been described as a "crude" and "unjust" scheme for
compensating workmen. 9 Many advocate replacing the former with
the latter.10 This seems wise and inevitable in time. Perhaps the chief
stumbling block today is the monetary amounts of the limited lia-
bility. 1 But many agree with Justice Roberts that the Court has
taken it upon itself to so amend the FELA and to this they object.
Finally, I cannot concur in the intimation, which I think the opin-
ion gives, that, as Congress has seen fit not to enact a workmen's
compensation law, this court will strain the law of negligence to
accord compensation where the employer is without fault.'2
Although the cry of judicial workmen's compensation has been
9 Stone v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., (dissenting opinion per Frankfurter, J.) 344
U.S. 407, 410 (1953).
10 Miller, "The Quest for a Federal Workmen's Compensation Law for Railroad
Employees" 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 188 (1953); Parker, "FELA or Uniform Com-
pensation for All Workers" 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 208 (1953). See also Stone v.
New York, C. & St. L.R.R., (dissenting opinion per Frankfurter, J.) supra note 9.
1 1 Pollack, "The Crisis in Work-Injury Compensation On and Off the Railroads"
1 Law & Contemp. Prob 296 (1953). It has been suggested that such a change is
strongly opposed by the railroad unions. Miller, supra note 10. But it has also been
pointed out that at an earlier date when the Act was more strictly construed, the rail-
roads were no less adamant in their opposition to replacing it with workmen's com-
pensation. DeParcq, "A Decade of Progress Under the FELA" 18 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 257 (1953).
12 Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., (dissenting opinion per Roberts, J.) 319 U.S. 350 at
354, 358 (1943). Mr. Justice Frankfurter echoes this sympathy in his dissenting opinion
in Stone v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., supra note 9 at 410.
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taken up frequently by the Court's critics, in view of the InmanP3
case it appears to be at least an exaggeration.
The Court continues to assert that the basis for liability is negli-
gence, 14 every trial court judge must so charge, and the recent Court
has never upset a jury finding of no negligence) 5
The fact that the bulk of these cases heard by the Supreme Court
on the merits are decided for plaintiffs16 is inconclusive when it is
considered that the Court only grants certiorari where it appears that
its standards have been misapplied, and that few lower courts have
been prone to misapply them in favor of plaintiffs.17
Certiorari is denied in many cases where a verdict has been
directed for the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff has failed
to present a jury issue on negligence.' While it is true that denial of
certiorari does not constitute an adjudication on the merits, 9 it is also
true that the Supreme Court seldom denies certiorari where an inferior
court has flagrantly disregarded its interpretation of the law.2"
"Violence to the Common Law"
More precisely what the Court has done has been to expand the
definition of a jury question.2
This decision that a jury verdict enjoys a preferred position
under the FELA is also subjected to heated dispute. Mr. Justice
Roberts dissenting in the Bailey case said:
[T]he Seventh Amendment envisages trial not by jury, but by
court and jury, according to the view of the common law and . . .
13 Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 5.
14 "The Act does not make the employer an insurer." Inman v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 361 U.S. at 140 (1959). "We conclude that the issue of negligence .. . should
have been submitted to the jury. . . " Davis v. Virginian Ry., 361 U.S. at 355 (1960).
"In this situation the employer's liability is to be determined under the general rule
which defines negligence. . . ." Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949).
15 See appendices cited supra note 7.
16 Supra note 7.
17 See, e.g., Griswold v. Gardner, (separate opinion of Major, J.) 155 F.2d 333, 334
(1946).
18 Supra note 7.
19 See Alderman, "What the New Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of
Negligence" 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 110, 147 (1953).
20 E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) dealing with coerced con-
fessions. The Court developed no new rules of law but strongly implied that the state
court had ignored United States Supreme Court precedents.
21 "This assumption, that railroads are made insurers where the issue of negligence
is left to the jury, is inadmissable. It rests on another assumption, this one unarticulated,
that juries will invariably decide negligence questions against railroads." Wilkerson v.
McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949).
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federal and state courts have not usurped power denied them by the
fundamental law in directing verdicts where a party failed to ad-
duce proof to support his contention, or in entering judgment not-
withstanding a verdict for like reasons.22
The positions taken by the opposing camps can be thus sum-
marized: The critics speak of the Court's having done violence to the
common law of negligence,23 while the Court has characterized the
FELA as "an avowed departure from the rules of the common law." 4
"Ad Hoc Determinations"
Another complaint is raised by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.
They maintain that these cases are not properly within the certiorari
function of the Court.", They base this premise on the conclusion
that reasonable judges of good conscience can differ as to what con-
stitutes a jury issue and that consequently this decision should be left
to the discretion of the lower courts.2 6 They assert that the Court has
not been fashioning any discernible standards of precedential value in
these cases 27 but has rather been attempting to "do justice" in in-
dividual cases; 28 a task traditionally outside the scope of the certiorari
jurisdiction. 29
22 Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., (dissenting opinion per Roberts, J.) 319 U.S. 350 at
354, 358 (1943).
23 Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., (dissenting opinion per Roberts, J.) supra note 22
at 358 (1943); see also Stone v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., (dissenting opinion per
Frankfurter, J.) 344 U.S. 407, 410-11 (1953); Wright, "The Employer's Liability Act:
Does the Supreme Court Want It Repealed," 45 A.B.A.J. 151 (1959) (This article also
takes the position that the Court has made the railroads "insurers"); Alderman, "What
the New Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of Neglignce" 18 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 110 (1953).
24 Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958).
25 Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, (dissenting opinion per Frankfurter, J.)
352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957) (This dissent also applied to Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352
U.S. 500 (1957), Webb v. Illinois C.R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957) and Herdman v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957). Justice Frankfurter refers to it as his dissent in
Rogers.) Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, (dissenting opinion per Harlan, J.)
352 U.S. at 559 (1957). See also Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., (dissenting opinion per
Harlan, J.) 361 U.S. 15 at 25 (1959).
26 Stone v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., (dissenting opinion per Frankfurter, J.)
supra note 9 at 411 (1953). See Gibson v. Thompson, (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.)
355 U.S. 18, 19 (1957).
27 Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., (dissenting opinion per Harlan, 3.) 361 U.S. at 25,
27-8 (1959).
28 Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., (dissenting opinion per Frankfurter,
J.) 352 U.S. at 525 (1957).
29 Ibid. Justice Frankfurter takes the position that the "historic right" of a Justice
to dissent frees him of any obligation to consider these cases on the merits. Ibid at
528. He therefore dissents in most of these cases on the ground that the writ of cer-
tiorari should be dismissed as "improvidently granted." Ibid at 526. See e.g. Davis v.
1960]
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The Questions
The substantial questions posed by these cases then are: (1) Has
the Court formulated any discernible standards for measuring a jury
case in this area and if so, (2) are these standards a valid interpreta-
tion of the Act.
THE HiSTORY
At the turn of the century while railroading was the most haz-
ardous of our nation's major occupations,"0 the common law, through
the doctrines of fellow servant,3' assumption of risk 2 and contributory
negligence,3 had effectively insulated employers against negligence
suits by their employees. Out of this background came the FELA.3 4
Recovery under the FELA is based on negligence 5 but the fellow-
servant doctrine is abolished 6 and the effect of contributory negligence
is reduced to that of comparative negligence3 7 As originally passed,
Virginian Ry., supra note 8. Cf. Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 5. Justice
Harlan while agreeing with Justice Frankfurter that certiorari should not be granted
in these cases, feels that the "rule of four" (certiorari is granted on the vote of four
concurring Justices) compels him to consider these cases on the merits when it has been
granted. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., (dissenting opinion per Harlan, J.)
352 U.S. at 559 (1957) See also Davis v. Virginian Ry., supra; Inman v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., supra; Gibson v. Thompson, supra note 26.
30 3rd Annual Rep. I.C.C. 84-95 (1889).
31 Priestly v. Fowler 3 M. & W. 1, 7 L.J. Ex. 42 (1837); Prosser, Torts § 68
(2d ed. 1955).
32 Ibid.
3 Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809); Prosser, Torts
§ 68 (2d ed. 1955).
34 The first FELA was enacted July 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232 (1906). It was declared
unconstitutional in The Employer's Liability -Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) as extending to
employees outside the scope of Congressional power under the commerce clause. It
was re-enacted with that defect cured on April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.
§ 51 (1958) and its constitutionality was upheld in the Second Employer's Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). In 1910 it was amended to expressly provide concurrent juris-
diction of state courts and a right of survival. 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 56, 59
(1958). In 1939 the scope of the Act was expanded to take advantage of the modem
interpretation of the commerce clause. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
85 "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce . . . [inter-
state] . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is em-
ployed by such carrier in such commerce, or in case of the death of such employee,
to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of . . . [certain relatives] for such
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due
to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment." (emphasis supplied) 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 53 Stat. 1404
(1939), 45 U.S.C. 51 (1958).
36 Ibid.
37 ". . . [Tlhe fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negli-
gence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
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the Act eliminated assumption of risk only where the negligence was
a breach of a federal railway safety statute. 8 In 1938 after that doc-
trine had been used rather freely for thirty years it was finally laid
to rest by Congress.m
TRa.AL By JuRY
With the employees' road to recovery finally cleared of the com-
mon-law pitfalls, the Court turned its attention to the last method by
which judges could control or frustrate (according to one's predelic-
tion) the jury's determination that the employee deserved to be com-
pensated; that is, the directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
The FELA does not expressly require a trial by jury but the Act
seems to contemplate one.40 Early cases held that state courts were
not required to furnish a jury trial in FELA actions where state proce-
dure did not so dictate.4
But in Bailey v. Central Vt. R.R. the Court stated that trial by
jury "is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under
the [FELA]," '42 basing that determination in part on the seventh
amendment.43
That same year the Court had stated how such a right should be
enforced:
Only by a uniform federal rule as to the necessary amount of evi-
dence may litigants under the federal act receive similar treatment
in all states.44
In 1946 in Lavender v. Kurn the Court gave an indication of
what the rule included:
[A] measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part
of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what
seems to them to be the most reasonable inference.45
Finally in 1956 in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. the "rule of
reason" was adopted:
Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee .... " 35 Stat. 66
(1903), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1958).
38 35 Stat. 65 (1908).
30 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1958); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
318 U.S. 54 (1943).
40 Supra note 37. Note the words ".. shall be diminshed by the jury
41 Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
42 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943).
43 Ibid. "The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and fundamental feature of our
system of federal jurisprudence." '
44 Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943).
45 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). See also Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649 (1947).
1960]
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proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence
played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death
for which damages are sought [emphasis added] .46
To rephrase the purpose of this paper then in light of the facts
of the controversy, the two questions presented are: (1) Is the "rule
of reason" really a rule? (2) Is it a valid rule?
THE ELEMENTS OF A FELA ACTION
Roughly speaking, to determine liability under the FELA, and
in common-law negligence actions, four issues must be decided by the
trier of fact: (1) What are the facts of the case? (2) Did these facts
constitute negligence on the defendant's part? (3) Did the conduct
complained of in fact cause the injury? (4) Was the negligence the
"proximate" or "legal" cause of the injury?4 7 At common law, where
"reasonable minds" can differ these are all questions for the jury 8
In a general verdict, and often in a special verdict, these elements
are indistinguishable in the jury's decision. For this reason, courts are
prone to lump the four together when speaking of what constitutes a
jury question. More clarity is obtained if they are discussed sepa-
rately.
NEGLIGENCE
Courts are prone to speak of the plaintiff as having "the burden
of proving negligence." This means that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving the facts from which he asks the jury to find negligence.
Negligence is the failure to meet a particular standard of care.49 No
one has the burden of proving the particular standard of care. The
general standard of care is determined by the court5 ° and in most of
these cases is, of course, that care which a reasonable prudent man
would exercise.5 ' The particular standard of care is determined by
the jury and is what the jury believes the reasonable prudent man
would have done in the circumstances it finds to have existed in the
particular case. 2 In so doing it should balance the utility of the ac-
46 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
47 Prosser, Torts § 39, 50 (2d ed. 1955).
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. at 30.
50 Ibid. at 39.
51 "In this situation the employer's liability is to be determined under the general
rule which defines negligence as the lack of due care under the circumstances; or the
failure to do what a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under
the circumstances of the situation. . . " Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S.
54, 67 (1943) ; Prosser, Torts §§ 31, 39 (2d ed. 1955).
52 "But the issue of negligence is one for juries to determine according to their
finding of whether an employer's conduct measures up to what a reasonable and pru-
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tor's conduct against the probability and probable severity of the harm
which might result with due consideration toward alternative methods
of accomplishing the same useful purpose and the feasibility of safe-
guards against the harm.3 Evidence as to these and other factors may
be relevant and will then be admitted. However, none need be and in
the absence of such evidence the jury can, in fact must, determine the
specific standard from its own knowledge. 4 Since no evidence need
be produced on this matter, it is impossible to say either party has the
burden of proving the specific standard of care.
In many of the FELA cases which the Court has decided there
was little question as to what actually happened. The controversy
was over whether or not defendant's conduct could be called negligent.
The confusion results because the Act has put negligence into certain
situations which are without precedent or analogy.
Take for example the Bailey case. 5 There plaintiff's decedent
was ordered to use a large wrench to open the hopper door of a car
sitting on a bridge. The wrench spun and knocked him from his nar-
row footing causing him to fall to his death. There was evidence of
safer alternatives. The key word is "ordered." The common law of
negligence knew nothing of a man's being "ordered" to do something.
If a man went onto the bridge voluntarily (even under the economic
compulsion of keeping his job) he assumed the risk and there was no
liability.!6 If he was physically compelled to go on the bridge the ac-
tion would be in intentional tort, not negligence. So the reasonable
prudent man has been required to enter a field with which he is not
familiar. It is understandable that disagreement should arise as to
what his conduct would be.
Note that this element is involved in both the Inman and Davis
cases, as well as Rogers which developed the rule of reason.
It seems clear today under the FELA that when an employer
orders an employee to do a negligent act or to perform a task which
would require negligent conduct to accomplish, the employer may be
held negligent for so ordering and the employee not contributorily
negligent for carrying out the order. 7
The cases of Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R. 8 and Stone v. New
dent person would have done under the same circumstances." Wilkerson v. McCarthy,
336 U.S. 53, 61 (1949) ; Prosser, Torts § 39 (2d ed. 1955).
53 Prosser, Torts § 30 at 122 (2d ed. 1955).
54 Ibid. § 32.
55 Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., supra note 12.
56 Thrussell v. Handyside & Co., 20 Q.B.D. 359 (1888); Woodley v. Metropolitan
Dist. Ry., 2 Ex. Div. 384 (1887).
57 Davis v. Virginian Ry., supra note 8; Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., supra note 12.
58 361 U.S. 15 (1959).
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York, C. & St. L. Ry.59 illustrate the logical extension of this rule into
an area even more remote to the common law. Harris was ordered to
pick up a large wooden block and Stone was removing a railroad tie.
After unsuccessful attempts both men complained that the job was too
difficult and both were ordered to continue. Both men injured their
backs.
It is difficult to picture a situation in which a recovery could be
had at common law for straining oneself. But the foreseeability was
there and once we accept the notion that an employer can be liable for
a negligent order and an employee not negligent in carrying it out,
the result follows.60
The common law obliged an employer to use reasonable care to
furnish an employee with a safe place to work. 1 He was considered
a business visitor and as such could recover from the employer for
negligently created or permitted conditions of the premises which
caused his injury, but only if in the exercise of due care he could not
have detected or avoided such conditions.62 But where the effect of
contributory negligence is reduced to that of comparative negligence
in carrying out a negligent order and assumption of risk abolished,
we have seen in the Bailey case that this last limitation is somewhat
diminished.
The Court has diminished this restriction even further. In
Wilkerson v. McCarthy6 3 the plaintiff was injured when he fell from
a dangerous walkway across a wheel pit. The company had erected
chains presumably to prevent such use but there was evidence tending
to show that these chains were circumvented with such frequency that
the employer knew or should have known of it. Although the em-
ployee may have been negligent, the Court emphasized the fact that
the employer is liable for injuries resulting "in whole or in part" from
its negligence and stated that the jury was at liberty to find that the
reasonable prudent railroad would have done more to protect its
employees against their own negligent conduct.
This theory was carried out of the area of safe place to work in
Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R.64 where the plaintiff was injured
when the gondola car he was using for a toilet was bumped. The
59 344 U.S. 407 (1953).
60 See also Blair v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 323 U.S. 600 (1945).
61 Choctaw, Okla., & G.R.R. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64 (1903); Patton v. Texas &
Pac. Ry., 179 U.S. 658 (1901); Union Pac. Ry. v. O'Brien, 161 U.S. 451 (1896).
62 Ragon v. Toledo, AA. & N.M. Ry., 97 Mich. 265, 56 N.W. 612 (1893); Prosser,
Torts § 67 (2d ed. 1955).
63 Supra note 52. See also Funkhouser, "What is a Safe Place to Work Under the
FELA," 17 Ohio St. L.. 367 (1956).
64 354 U.S. 901 (1957).
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Supreme Court felt that there was evidence from which the jury could
find that the railroad was aware of this dangerous practice and pre-
sumably that they should have taken measures to stop it.
PROXIDATE CAUSE
Few true proximate-cause cases have arisen under the Act and
none of them, outside the area of violation of safety statutes, has
significantly demonstrated that the Court will deviate from common
law concepts.
Causation in Fact
Proximate cause or "legal" cause, as it is sometimes called, is
made up of both factual and policy considerations. Causation in fact
is often stated in terms of a requirement that it must appear that "but
for" the defendant's conduct the injury would not have occurred.65
But causation is a fact which must always be inferred, for notions of
cause and effect are but projections of human experience onto a
sequence of events.66
When a person gets into an automobile, drives down the street
and runs over another, it is not difficult for us to say that the victim
has received certain injuries which he would not have received but
for the driver's conduct, that is, the conduct of driving the car. But
it must also appear they would not have occurred but for the defend-
ant's negligent conduct. Suppose the jury finds that to drive over
sixty miles per hour is negligent and that defendant was driving
seventy. If the jury must find that the injury would not have occurred
but for the fact that he was driving seventy, the causal inference is
more difficult. The projection of human experience is not so precise in
determining this type of question. The best it can do is tell us that
it is more likely that the injury would occur at the greater speed.
Make the negligent "conduct" an omission or add a subjective
human factor and there is still less certainty. Suppose the alleged
negligence is not having lights on the automobile at dusk. Now we
must say that the defendant would not have hit the victim if he had
lights, or that he would not have hit him but for the fact that he did
not. Even the victim cannot say definitely that he would have
seen the car if it had had lights or that he would have been able to get
out of the way if he had.
But common sense tells us that some conduct of this type creates
unreasonable risks of harm and is hence negligent. Therefore the jury
must be allowed to infer causation within the bounds of reason.
As a general rule, if in ordinary experience a certain kind of con-
65 Prosser, Torts § 44 (2d ed. 1955).
66 5 Encyclopedia Britannica 62-65 (1958).
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duct could be expected to produce a certain result and such result does
in fact follow the conduct, the jury will be permitted to infer that the
conduct caused the result.6 7 This rule justifies the result in Tenant v.
Peoria & P. U. Ry.6 and the first decision in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R.6 9 Both cases involve employees run down by trains back-
ing at night. In the first case the train started without ringing its bell,
in the second the train had no light on the end toward which it was
backing.
The Court did not speak of this rule but talked rather of the
jury's liberty to draw reasonable inferences and a presumption that
the employee was performing his duties and exercising due care for
his own safety.
Policy Aspects
The policy aspects of proximate cause are most often couched
in terms of foreseeability. At common law, liability for negligent con-
duct is limited to that kind of injury, the risk whereof made the con-
duct negligent. The reason usually given is that if one is to be made
to compensate injury merely for creating an unreasonable risk, his
liability should be limited to cases in which that risk is fulfilled rather
than extended to injuries which incidently follow it in a sequence of
causation.7" Where this "proximate" aspect of causation is met, the
jury will often be permitted to infer causation in fact.
This aspect of proximate cause prevented plaintiff's recovery in
Brady v. Southern Ry.7' in 1943. There plaintiff's decedent was
killed when the car on which he was riding hit a derailer from the
back side and left the track because the rail opposite the device was
defective. The majority felt that the evidence established that hitting
a derailer from the back side was so unusual as to be unforeseeable. Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for the dissent, said that causation means
simply "an event which contributes to produce a result."72
Although Justice Black is more often in the majority today and
though this statement would seem to repudiate the "proximate" aspect
of causation it should be read in light of the evidence in that case
which to the average reader might open to question the majority's
determination that hitting a derailer from the back side was "unfore-
seeable. 73
67 Prosser, Torts § 44 at 223 (2d ed. 1955).
68 321 U.S. 29 (1944).
69 Supra note 51.
70 Prosser, Torts § 70 (2d ed. 1955).
71 Supra, note 44.
72 320 U.S. at 488-89.
73 The majority based this finding on the testimony of a railroad superintendent
of 22 years experience who said "it happens very frequently. . . . I have seen it 25 to
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Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Davis raises the question of proxi-
mate cause. He takes the view that the employer's negligence (in
giving the order for the rush job with inexperienced help) "caused"
the injury only in that it required the plaintiff to take a position on the
cars rather than his normal position on the ground. This presumably
created no unreasonable risk since other employees took these posi-
tions as a matter of routine. Justice Harlan noted particularly that the
plaintiff could not say that he fell because he was rushed. 4 But
could he ever so state any more than the man in the hypothetical case
previously mentioned could say that he would not have been hit by the
car had the driver had lights, and is the inference much more difficult
here than there?
PROOF OF THE FACTS
The Court has adopted the rule that in determining whether or
not to submit the cause to the jury the courts must consider only
the evidence most favorable to the party against whom the preemptive
instructions are requested, i.e. the plaintiff.
This rule is based upon the prerogative of the jury to believe or
disbelieve evidence. Therefore, if at the close of the plaintiff's evi-
dence he has established a prima facie case, the jury in theory could
disbelieve all of the defendant's evidence and reasonably find for
plaintiff.
But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's
verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are
inconsistent with its conclusion.75
In a common-law negligence action, the burden of proof as to facts
constituting negligence is on the plaintiff.7 6 This has been defined as
the burden of taking the juror's mind out of equilibrium and convinc-
ing him that it is more probable that what the plaintiff asserts is true
than the converse.7 7 The question is for the jury where "reasonable
minds" might differ. So the judge's function is merely to determine
whether any reasonable mind could be convinced that it is more prob-
able that what the plaintiff asserts is true than the converse.
50 times." The Court apparently assumed that he had witnessed every such event that
occurred during his 22 years' experience (on the tracks and in the office) and that twice
a year was too infrequent to be deemed foreseeable. 320 U.S. at 483.
74 361 U.S. at 358.
7 Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). See also Hill, "Substance and Pro-
cedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem," 17 Ohio St. L.J.
384, 393 (1956).
76 Prosser, Torts § 41 (2d ed. 1955).
77 Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litiga-
tion (1956).
78 Op. cit. supra note 48.
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Despite what is often said about the Supreme Court shifting the
burden of proof,79 there is nothing in any of these opinions that would
require the trial judge to alter the common law charge on burden of
proof in a FELA action. These opinions go strictly to the standard
which the judge applies in determining whether the issue should go
to the jury.
The reasonable mind which the judge employs as a standard in
a common law case has been referred to as "learned reason."80 It is
said to be more narrow than the layman's concept of reason and to
include such factors as control of the jury's propensity to be free with
others' money and perhaps the judge's socio-economic predelictions8 1
The Rogers "rule of reason" has attempted to remove these fac-
tors from the concept of "learned reason" and to leave something
closer to laymen's "reason."
A case which illustrates both of these propositions, is Lavender
v. Kurn"2 from which the preceding quotation was taken. Their plain-
tiff's decedent, a switchman who had opened a switch to allow a train
to back into the station, was found along side the tracks, dead of a
skull fracture. The plaintiff's evidence tended to demonstrate the
plausibility of the decedent's having been hit by a mail hook. The
only direct proof was a statement of an unknown brakeman at the
scene (repeated on the stand by a defense witness) that the plaintiff
had been so killed, which statement was admitted as part of the res
gestae. The railroad introduced testimony tending to disprove this
and to show the plausibility of (but not conclusively demonstrate)
murder. No other possible causes were advanced nor do any spring
to the mind. The Supreme Court held the case for the jury. Learned
reason might say that the proofs were in equilibrium, and that there-
fore the party with the burden must lose in the "reasonable mind."
But in view of the absence of other plausable causes, would the lay-
man consider that man unreasonable who, on the one hand considered
the fact that non-intentional violent death is more common than
murder or, on the other hand, disbelieved the railroad's evidence, and
then found it more probable than not that the decedent was struck
by the mail hook?
THE "CLEARER" RULES
It appears that in these cases the Court has formulated at least
three minor rules that are discernible. For negligence in the uncharted
area of master and servant it has demonstrated two situations from
79 E.g., Wright, op. cit. supra note 10.
80 Allen, "Learned and Unlearned Reason" 36 Jurid. Rev. 254 (1924).
81 Bohlen, "Mixed Questions of Law and Fact," 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 118-9 (1924).
82 Supra note 75.
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which a jury might find negligence. (1) A master can be negligent in
giving an order to an employee to act negligently or to perform a task
which would reasonably require negligence to perform and the servant
may not be negligent in carrying out such an order.8 3 (2) A railroad
may be required to use due care to prevent its employees from engag-
ing in a dangerous course of conduct, once it is aware or should be
aware of such a course of conduct.8 4
In the area of evidence, the Court has adopted the rule that in
passing on a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. the trial
court must look only to the evidence most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is directed, basing this rule on the prerogative
of the jury to disbelieve evidence. 8
As to proximate cause, it does not appear that the Court has
adopted any rules for the FELA significantly different from the com-
mon law rule in negligence cases.86
THE "RULE OF REAsON"
The Rogers "Rule of Reason" pervades all three of the elements
of an FELA action previously discussed.87 In its semantic formulation
it does not vary much from the "reasonable minds" test of the com-
mon law. But looking at the cases to which it has been applied one
sees that it is closer to the "rational basis in the record" test88 which
is applied in reviewing some administrative decisions or the "scin-
tilla"89 rule formerly applied in some jurisdictions. More broadly,
the rule seems to say that courts can no longer apply a "learned"
reason with all its underlying policy connotations but that the sole
test of a jury question is whether a man who would find for the plain-
tiff from the evidence would be considered "unreasonable" in the
ordinary sense of the word. Yet this is not without limits, for the
very imaginative might find almost any projection of circumstantial
proof "reasonable."
83 S-upra p. 429.
84 Supra p. 430.
85 Supra pp. 433-4.
86 Supra pp. 431-2.
87 Justice Harlan has said that the rule of reason as announced in Rogers applied
only to "causation" and was extended to negligence in later cases. Sinkler v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., (dissenting opinion per Harlan, J.) 356 U.S. 326, 332 note 1 and accompanying
text. It is submitted that the Missouri Supreme Court (which Rogers reversed) merely
used the "proximate cause" idiom to express its view that in the "negligent order" case,
it is the employee who is negligent rather than the employer. 284 S.W.2d 467 (1955).
88 "But such evidence [evidence supporting defendant's theory] has become irrele-
vant upon appeal, there being a reasonable basis in the record for inferring that the
hook struck Haney." Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652 (1946).
89 See Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., (concurring opinion per Whittaker, J.) 361
U.S. 138, 141 (1959).
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Is IT ENFORCEABLE?
It should be clear that when we deal with concepts such as
reasonable minds differing and minds being in and out of equilibrium
we are in a rather nebulous region. But the Court's approach to this
seems to be that merely because a line must necessarily be hazy is
no reason why its location cannot be changed. Justice Douglas has
spoken of the Court's "stewardship" of these cases." Perhaps what
he means is that an indefinite rule can be changed only by creating a
new atmosphere rather than by any lucid statements in an opinion.
One need only glance through the state and lower federal court
advance sheets to see that causes are being sent to the jury that would
never be in common law negligence actions. 91 The Inman case and the
number of directed-verdict cases in which certiorari is denied illustrate
that there is also a bottom to this rule and that every cause need not
be sent to the jury, much less every injury be compensated. 2
But it is frequently complained that lower courts have no way
of predicting on which side of the "rule of reason," the Supreme Court
will think a particular case falls.93 The common law "reasonable
minds" test is not noted for its predictability. The "rule of reason"
may be no more predictable but neither is it much less. In the realm
of negligence it is clear that the railroad may be held to a strict stand-
ard of careful conduct. If the ordinary man could in any way point
an accusing finger at the employer in respect to the injury he may be
held to compensate it.
It is interesting to note that in three of the six cases which have
upheld withdrawal of the cause from the jury the allegedly negligent
conduct promoted the safety of third parties. In Inman, the plaintiff
was stationed in an allegedly "unsafe place to work" to flag motorists
at the approach of a train. In Herdman v. Pennsylvania R.R.94 plain-
tiff conductor was injured when emergency brakes were applied for
the purpose (by his own admission) of avoiding a collision with an
automobile on the tracks.
Proof of Fact
In drawing inferences from circumstantial facts the jury will
be bound only by ordinary reason. In Moore v. Chesapeake & 0.
R.R95 . the jury was not allowed to infer that emergency brakes were
90 Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., (concurring opinion per Douglas, J.) 361 U.S. 15
at 16 (1959).
91 See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Henagan, 272 F.2d 153 (1959). Note
the interesting "proximate cause" question presented.
92 Supra note 7.
93 Hart, "The Supreme Court, 1958 Term" 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 at 96-98 (1959).
94 352 U.S. 518 (1957).
95 340 U.S. 573 (1951).
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applied unreasonably from the mere fact that they were applied. Note
the contravailing safety aspect. In Inman a statement by a witness,
not elaborated upon, describing the drunken driver who hit plaintiff
as, "like a lot of them I seen there, jumping the gun,"96 was not
allowed to be the basis of a jury finding that reckless driving was so
prevalent at the crossing that defendant had constructive notice of it.
Is IT SouND?
The correct interpretation of a statute is something far removed
from mathematical proof, since no one is possessed with absolute
knowledge of the mythical "legislative intent."9
The Court has looked to the Acts reference to the jury, the
Seventh Amendment, the words "injury resulting in whole or in part
[from defendant's negligence]," and the abolition of the harsh com-
mon-law defenses (almost invariably applied by the court as a matter
of law rather than by the jury) and decided that Congress intended
that the plaintiff should have his case tried to the jury.
The Court apparently feels that judges through too free a use
of the directed verdict and judgment n.o.v, often infringe this right
to jury trial. In common law actions the Supreme Court is bound by
deep-rooted precedent to approve this conduct but apparently it feels
no such compulsion in statutory actions.
One cannot but take notice of the poor financial position today
of many railroads. Many have suggested replacing the FELA with
a workmen's compensation act. This would no doubt be fairer to the
railroads and to injured workmen as a whole. But the Court's critics
have been the loudest to agree that the Court itself cannot make this
change (particularly without limited liability).
When railroads were financial giants and the FELA was passed,
only an alarmist could have suspected that the Act might bankrupt
railroads and when the directed verdict and assumption of risk were
in full bloom the railroads vigorously opposed a shift to workmen's
compensation. 98
When the FELA was enacted the Congress obviously intended
to liberalize recovery for railroad workers negligently injured, and
despite the economic effect on an already sagging industry it appears
that until Congress speaks again it will remain liberalized.
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.
90 361 U.S. at 140.
97 See Hart, op. cit. supra note 93 and the reply by Arnold, "Professor Hart's
Theology," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 (1960).
98 Supra note 11.
